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Abstract
As a major source for information on virtually any topic, Wikipedia serves an important
role in public dissemination and consumption of knowledge. As a result, it presents tremen-
dous potential for people to promulgate their own points of view; such efforts may be more
subtle than typical vandalism. In this paper, we introduce new behavioral metrics to quantify
the level of controversy associated with a particular user: a Controversy Score (C-Score) based
on the amount of attention the user focuses on controversial pages, and a Clustered Contro-
versy Score (CC-Score) that also takes into account topical clustering. We show that both these
measures are useful for identifying people who try to “push” their points of view, by showing
that they are good predictors of which editors get blocked. The metrics can be used to triage
potential POV pushers. We apply this idea to a dataset of users who requested promotion to
administrator status and easily identify some editors who significantly changed their behav-
ior upon becoming administrators. At the same time, such behavior is not rampant. Those
who are promoted to administrator status tend to have more stable behavior than comparable
groups of prolific editors. This suggests that the Adminship process works well, and that the
Wikipedia community is not overwhelmed by users who become administrators to promote
their own points of view.
1 Introduction
Wikipedia has become a one-stop source for information on nearly any subject. In aggregate, it
has the power to broadly influence public perceptions. Wikipedia’s ubiquity creates strong in-
centives for biased editing, attracting editors with strong opinions on controversial topics. At the
same time, Wikipedia is self-policing, and over time the Wikipedia community has formulated a
comprehensive set of policies to prevent editors from “pushing” their own points of view on the
readership (“POV pushing”). Most policing takes the form of users editing or reverting disputed
content, while persistent violations are brought to the attention of administrators. A responding
administrator has the power to temporarily protect pages from being edited, and to block users
from editing. POV pushing is not considered vandalism on Wikipedia, the latter term being re-
served for blatantly ill-intentioned edits.
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While there has been a lot of attention paid to the problems of vandalism and maintenance
on Wikipedia, there has been little systematic, quantitative investigation of the phenomenon of
POV pushing. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a serious issue. For example,
in April 2008 a pro-Palestinian online publication called Electronic Intifada released messages
from the pro-Israel media watchdog group CAMERA (the Committee for Accuracy in Middle
East Reporting in America) that asked for volunteers to help “keep Israel related entries ... from
becoming tainted by anti-Israel editors.” The messages also contained blueprints explaining how
members could become Wikipedia administrators, and then use their power to further the goals of
the organization [1]. In 2006, there was a significant controversy surrounding edits to Wikipedia
pages of prominent U.S. politicians, made by their own staff.1
To further illustrate the importance of the problem, in an interview with Alex Beam of the
Boston Globe, Gilead Ini, who initiated the CAMERA campaign, said “[Wikipedia] may be the most
influential source of information in the world today, and we and many others think it is broken”
[2]. But another quote from Ini highlights the difficulty of confronting these issues, “Wikipedia
is a madhouse. We were making a good-faith effort to ensure accuracy.” Indeed, Wikipedia poli-
cies typically assume good faith. The policy on vandalism states “Even if misguided, willfully
against consensus, or disruptive, any good-faith effort to improve the encyclopedia is not vandal-
ism. Edit warring over content is not vandalism.”2 In addition to the difficulty of arguing against
good faith when editors may simply be attempting to disseminate strongly held beliefs, even more
subtle forms of manipulation can achieve a similar outcome. For example, a manipulative admin-
istrator may enforce Wikipedia’s Neutral Point Of View (NPOV) guidelines selectively, reverting
only edits that take a particular point of view. Hypothetically, a manipulative admin with a con-
servative viewpoint may revert all edits that seem to push a liberal viewpoint, while leaving those
that push a conservative viewpoint untouched (or vice versa for a manipulative liberal admin).
While there is nothing technically “wrong” with this, it can significantly affect the information on
pages.
It is worth noting that even if there is attempted manipulation on sensitive pages, it is restricted
to a relatively small fraction of Wikipedia. Most pages are more “encyclopaedic” in nature (for
example, pages on mathematics or on algorithms), and generate less controversy than pages that
deal with current events or ideologies.
All of this cries out for a useful algorithmic method of detecting potential POV pushing behav-
ior, and quantitative metrics that can provide evidence and allow us to examine the behavior of
such users in more detail. In this paper we present two such metrics and then use them to examine
the behavior of the population of administrators.
The first metric, the Controversy Score (“C-Score”), measures the proportion of energy an ed-
itor spends on controversial pages. It works by first assigning a controversy score to each page.
This score is based on factors that have been identified as well-correlated with controversy, in-
cluding the number of revisions to an article’s talk page, the fraction of minor edits on the talk
page, and the number of times it has been protected [8]. It is independent of language or content,
and therefore easily generalizable. An editor’s C-Score is then the mean of the controversy scores
of the pages she edits, weighted by the proportion of her editing attention she focuses on those
pages.
While the C-Score is a useful measure, it does not account for the topical clustering of a user’s
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Staffer_Edits retrieved 11/4/2011.
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Vandalism retrieved 11/4/2011.
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edits. This is particularly important when we use these scores to assess the behavior of adminis-
trators, because administrators’ responsibilities imply that they will spend more time on contro-
versial pages in general. However, we would expect users who have strong opinions on a topic to
push their POV especially in pages related to that topic, rather than broadly across many different
controversial topics. Consider two editors A and B, with 100 edits each. They each have 25 edits
on the article about the U.S. Republican party. Editor A’s remaining edits are about Republican
legislators and Republican sponsored legislation from the past 10 years, while B’s are divided be-
tween the IRA, the Catholic Church, and Jimmy Wales. All of B’s edits are controversial, but only
some of A’s edits are. While B has more controversial edits, we would intuitively consider A to be
more suspicious.
To deal with editors of this form, we introduce the Clustered Controversy Score (“CC-Score”),
which takes into account the similarity among different pages that a user has edited, in addition
to how controversial those pages are. We expect the CC-Score to be particularly useful for triage,
as it is designed to be a high recall measure: it flags potentially manipulative users, who focus
their attention on specific topic areas that include controversial topics. Of course, some users who
have editing patterns of this form may be acting in good faith and just have deep interests in that
topic.
Both the C-Score and the CC-score are behavioral. They do not rely in any way on the specific
text of edits, only on the patterns of editing and interaction between editors. We demonstrate the
validity of the two scores by showing that they have predictive power in discriminating between
heavy editors who were blocked and equally heavy editors who were not. Having validated
them on an exogenous measure, we then apply these measures in order to analyze the behavior
of administrators. We compare the editing patterns of administrators who score highly on the
C-Score and the CC-Score. The CC-Score identifies administrators who would not have been
identified by the simple C-Score, because only some of the major pages on the topics they edit are
highly controversial. These administrators also edit a long tail of related pages, thus influencing
public perception of the topic at large.
Finally, we use the CC-Score to test whether or not admins are behaving in a truly manipulative
manner: first becoming trusted and attaining promotion to admin status, and then using this
trusted status to push their points of view in particular domains. To do so, we look at changes in
CC-score before and after the editor stood for promotion (the Request for Adminship, or “RfA”
process). While we find several instances of potentially suspicious changes of focus, we also note
that the overall behavior of the population of editors who become admins is better than that of
two comparable populations: (1) those who stood for election but failed; and (2) those who edited
prolifically but never stood for election to administrator status. The population behavior is better
in the sense that the variance of changes in the CC-Score pre- and post-RfA is lower, indicating that
those who fail in their RfAs actually change their behavior more significantly. Thus, Wikipedia
admins as a population do not misrepresent themselves in order to gain their trusted status.
1.1 Contributions
We introduce two new behavioral measures that indicate whether or not a user is trying to push
his or her point of view on Wikipedia pages. These measures have predictive power on historical
data: they can determine which users were blocked for disputes related to controversial editing.
We anticipate that these measures can be used for auditing or triage: they can flag potentially
suspicious behavior automatically for more detailed human investigation. The measures are be-
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havioral and general, and do not rely on specifics of text edited by users, and are thus applicable
beyond Wikipedia.
We then show how these measures can be used to discover interesting changes in behavior, fo-
cusing on the behavioral changes of editors who applied for promotion to administrator status on
Wikipedia. While there are instances of suspicious looking changes in behavior upon promotion
to administrator status, we find that at the population-level, Wikipedia editors are in fact better
behaved than the population of prolific editors, in the sense that their behavior is more stable, and
does not change significantly upon promotion. While there are specific instances that seem suspi-
cious, our evidence suggests that the Wikipedia adminship process works well at the population
level: there is no evidence that editors are in general seeking promotion to adminship so they can
“push” their point of view on the larger population.
2 Related work
There is a large literature on many different aspects of Wikipedia as a collaborative community. It
is now well-established that Wikipedia articles are high quality [5] and very popular on the Web
[12]. The dynamics of how articles become high quality and how information grows in collective
media like Wikipedia have also garnered some attention [14, 4]. While there has not been much
work on how Wikipedia itself influences public opinion on particular topics, it is not hard to draw
the analogy with search engines like Google, which have the power to direct a huge portion of the
focus of public attention to specific pages. Hindman et al discuss how this can lead to a few highly
ranked sites coming to dominate political discussion on the Web [6]. Subsequent research shows
that the combination of what users search for and what Google directs them to may lead to more
of a “Googlocracy” than the “Googlearchy” of Hindman et al [10].
Our work in this paper draws directly on three major streams of literature related to Wikipedia.
These are, work on conflict and controversy, automatic vandalism detection, and the process of
promotion to adminship status on Wikipedia.
There is a significant body of work characterizing conflict on Wikipedia. Kittur et al introduce
new tools for studying conflict and coordination costs in Wikipedia [8]. Vuong et al characterize
controversial pages using both disputes on a page and the relationships between articles and con-
tributors [13]. We use the measures identified by Kittur et al and Vuong et al as a starting point
for measuring the controversy level associated with a page. This then feeds into our user-level
C-Score and CC-Score measures. Our results on the blocked users dataset serve as corroborating
evidence for the usefulness of these previously identified measures.
Automatic vandalism detection has been a topic of interest from both the engineering perspec-
tive (many bots on Wikipedia automatically find and revert vandalism), as well as from a scientific
perspective. Smets et al report that existing bots, while useful, are “far from optimal”, and report
on the results of a machine learning approach for attempting to identify vandalism [11]. They
conclude that this is a very difficult problem to solve without incorporating semantic information.
While we touch on vandalism in dealing with blocked users, we are focused on “POV pushing”
by extremely active users who are unlikely to engage in petty vandalism, which is the focus of
most work on automated vandalism detection.
Wikipedia administrator selection is an independently interesting social process. Burke and
Kraut study this process in detail and build a model for which candidates will be successful once
they choose to stand for promotion and go through the Request for Adminship (RfA) process
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[3]. The dataset of users who stand for promotion is useful because it allows us to compare both
previous and later behavior of users who were successful and became admins and those who did
not.
Finally, we use a similarity metric for articles based on editors which is similar to existing work
on expert-based similarity [9].
3 Methodology
We begin by discussing our methodology in computing the “simple” Controversy Score for each
user, and then describe how we can compute a Clustered Controversy Score that captures editors
who focus on articles related to a single, controversial topic.
All data is from an April 2011 database dump of the English Wikipedia. The term “article”
refers to a page in Wikipedia’s article namespace along with any pages in the article talk names-
pace with the same name, unless otherwise specified.
3.1 Controversy Score
We define the C-Score for a user as an edit-proportion-weighted average of the level of controversy
of each page. The controversy of a page (loosely following the article-level conflict model of Kittur
et al [8]) is based on the number of revisions to an article’s talk page, the fraction of minor edits
on an article’s talk page, and the number of times a page is “protected”, where editing by new or
anonymous users is limited.
We scale and shift each of the three quantities above such that their 5th and 95th percentiles
are equal, then take the mean. Next, we transform this number such that the lowest values are
at -5 and 1% of articles have scores above 0. Finally, the scores are transformed using the logistic
function 1/(1+e−t). This produces a controversy score ck ∈ [0, 1] for each page. One alternative to
manual tuning is logistic regression, where a model is trained on a data set reflecting some notion
of controversy.
Let pk be the fraction of a user’s edits on page k. The controversy score for a user is then an
edit-weighted average of the page-level controversy scores:
C− Score =
∑
k
pkck (1)
We would expect this measure to be effective at finding users who edit controversial pages.
However, many Wikipedia users dedicate at least part of their time to removing blatant vandalism,
which occurs disproportionally on controversial pages. Thus we turn to a measure that combines
topical clustering with controversy.
3.2 Clustered Controversy Score
We work from the hypothesis that users who concentrate their edits have some vested interest in
those articles. Going back to the example in the Introduction, we would like to be able to detect
users like A, who focuses almost entirely on Republican politics. While A’s edits include some
controversial pages, B fights vandalism broadly, and so has exclusively controversial edits. B has
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the same number of edits to the article on the U.S. Republican Party as A, but the rest of B’s edits
are scattered across other topics. A’s edits to this article are interesting; they are topically related
to A’s other edits. At the same time, edits to this article by editor B are far less interesting.
We would like to incorporate a measure of topical edit concentration into the C-Score. In order
to do so, we could define topics globally, but this is both expensive and sensitive to parameter
changes: what is the correct granularity for a topic? Instead, we focus on a local measure of
topical concentration. Given a similarity metric between articles, we can measure the extent to
which a user’s edits are clustered.
Page similarity We base our score on a generalization of the clustering coefficient to weighted
networks with edge weights between 0 and 1 [7]. Several natural measures of page similarity have
values in this rage.
We consider pages which link to (or are linked from) the same pages as similar, pages edited
by the same users as similar, and pages in the same categories as similar. Each page has a set of
incoming links I , outgoing links Θ, users U , and categories Γ associated with it. To determine
how similar two pages are based on one of these sets, we divide the cardinality of the intersection
of the sets from each page by the cardinality of their union (the Jaccard coefficient). To compute
a single similarity score between two pages i and j, we take an average of scores for each type of
set, giving equal weight to links, users, and categories. The similarity score wij is then:
wij =
1
6
|Ii ∩ Ij |
|Ii ∪ Ij | +
1
6
|Θi ∩Θj |
|Θi ∪Θj | +
1
3
|Ui ∩ Uj |
|Ui ∪ Uj | +
1
3
|Γi ∩ Γj |
|Γi ∪ Γj | (2)
Computing the CC-Score Consider a set of edits from a user. Let N be the number of unique
pages in this set and wij be the similarity score between pages i and j. We start with a generaliza-
tion of the clustering coefficient [7]. For a page k, define:
clust(k) =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1wkiwkjwij∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1wkiwkj
(3)
The clustering coefficient will be higher when other pages in the edit set are related to k and to
each other. When computing the CC-Score for the entire edit set, there are two other factors we
would like to consider: how much a user concentrated on any given page, and how controversial
that page is. Let pk be the proportion of edits on page k, and ck be some measure of controversy.
Then we have the following coefficient for the edit set:
CC− Score =
N∑
k=1
pkckclust(k) (4)
Since
∑N
k=1 pk = 1, (4) is a weighted average. If ck ∈ [0, 1], then so is (4). Pushing raw contro-
versy scores through a sigmoid to produce ck ensures that this condition holds, and also prevents
outliers from unduly affecting the final score.
There is no reason that ck must be a measure of controversy. Instead, it can measure any prop-
erty of a page which is of interest. For example, a ck measuring how much a page relates to global
warming would yield a ranking of editors based on the extent to which their edits concentrate
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on global warming. The CC-Score is a general tool for ranking single-topic contributors based
on some property of that topic. We also compute a raw Clustering Score where each page has the
same ck – this yields a measure of topical clustering independent of any properties of the particular
pages.
We choose a measure that combines clustering and controversy page-wise rather than user-
wise so that we do not end up with editors who are very topically focused on uncontroversial
pages (say Flamingos), but also spend a significant fraction of their time combating vandalism
broadly across a spectrum of topics. We also note that the only Wikipedia-specific contributions
to the CC-Score are encapsulated in the computation of ck and wij . The same quantities can be
computed for a wide variety of collaborative networks. Consider email messages: wij between
two threads could be based on senders and recipients, and ck based on the length of the thread as
a measure of controversy. These quantities are entirely language independent, although we might
make use of natural language processing to improve estimates of both similarity and controversy.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate our metrics in several different ways. First, to establish their validity, we examine
whether the metrics provide discriminatory power in identifying potentially manipulative users.
In order to do so, we need an independent measure of manipulation, so we focus on users that
were blocked from editing on Wikipedia, and compare them with a similar set who were not
blocked. One of the goals of our work is to provide an objective metric for analyzing adminis-
trators, who have gained significant status in Wikipedia. We present some detail on the editing
habits of the admins who score highest on our metrics. In doing so, we also use our metrics to
provide fresh insight into what is controversial on Wikipedia, by analyzing the topic distribution
of edits amongst admins with high CC-Scores.
A reasonable hypothesis, suggested by the CAMERA messages discussed in Section 1 is that
people who wish to seriously push their points of view on Wikipedia may try to become admins
by editing innocuously, and then changing their behavior once they become admins. In order to
examine this hypothesis, we look at the behavior of admins whose CC-Scores changed signifi-
cantly, as well as at the distribution of changes in the CC-Score.
4.1 Blocked users
Users can be blocked from Wikipedia for a variety of reasons. Reasons for blocks include blatant
vandalism (erasing the content of a page), editorial disputes (repeatedly reverting another user’s
edits), threats, and more. Many blocks are of new or anonymous editors for blatant vandalism;
we are not interested in these blocks.
We are interested in blocks stemming from content disputes. While editors are not directly
blocked for contributing to controversial articles, controversy on Wikipedia is often accompanied
by “edit warring”, where two or more editors with mutually exclusive goals repeatedly make
changes to a page (e.g., one editor thinks the article on Sean Hannity should be low priority for
WikiProject Conservatism, and another thinks it should be high priority).
We examine a set of users who were active between January 2010 and April 2011. For blocked
users, we use 180 days of data, directly before the block. For the users who were never blocked,
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Figure 1: ROC curve for CC, Controversy, and Clustering Scores when differentiating between
blocked and not-blocked users, based on 180 days of data. The CC and Controversy Scores effec-
tively discriminate between these classes, whereas the Clustering Score does not.
the 180 days ends on one of their edits chosen randomly. In order to filter out new or infre-
quent editors, we only consider users with between 500 and 1000 edits during this 180 day period.
The upper bound removes users who do significant amounts of automated editing; it is not un-
common for such accounts to be blocked for misbehaving scripts which have nothing to do with
controversy. By examining only exceptionally active users, we eliminate most petty reasons for
blocks; users who have made hundreds of legitimate contributions are unlikely to start blanking
pages. After the filtering, we are left with 178 blocked users and 236 who were never blocked.
Figure 1 shows the performance of the CC, Controversy, and Clustering Scores when discrim-
inating between the blocked users and users who were never blocked. Both the CC- and C-Scores
show significant discriminative power, while Clustering alone is no better than guessing.
The performance of the CC- and C-Scores on the blocked users data set validates both mea-
sures for detecting users who make controversial contributions to Wikipedia. Many blocks in this
data set involve violations of Wikipedia’s “3 Revert Rule”, limiting the number of contributions
which an editor can revert on a single page during any 24 hour period, which implies that editors
are not only making controversial changes but are vigorously defending them. This rule is not
automatically enforced and does not apply to blatant vandalism; instead, another user must post
a complaint which is then reviewed by an administrator. It is certainly possible to edit controver-
sial pages while following the rules closely and never getting blocked, and likewise some blocks
of active users have nothing to do with controversy (rogue scripts, for example). All else being
equal, we expect more controversial editors to be blocked more frequently. The discriminative
power of the CC- and C-Scores provides strong evidence that these scores are correctly detecting
8
controversial editors.
4.2 Highest scoring admins
We now turn to examining the behavior of admins through the lens of the Controversy and CC-
Scores. Where do admins focus their attention, and what is controversial on Wikipedia? To explore
this issue, we use human evaluations of the edit history of administrators during the 180 days
after they became an administrator. Without knowing anything about the CC, Controversy, or
Clustering Scores associated with the edit history, a reviewer analyzed the top 50 pages edited by
a user and decided which general category, if any, the edits were in. Results for the top and bottom
100 administrators ranked by each score are presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2 is useful validation for our methodology: for example, administrators with very low
CC-Scores were often classified as not editing in a coherent general category. Conversely, users
with a high CC-Score were much more likely to be topically focused. This effect is even more
apparent for the raw Clustering Score, with 73% of the bottom 100 admins classified as topically
unfocused. This implies that our article similarity metric corresponds with an intuitive notion of
topical similarity.
There are some interesting differences in the topic areas of the 100 admins with the highest
C-Scores and the 100 with the highest CC-Scores. As expected, the C-Score picks up a substantial
chunk of editors with no particular focus, while the CC score does not. These are admins who
are doing their job of “policing” controversy across a broad spectrum of topics. Surprisingly, the
C-Score picks up more politically focused editors while the CC-Score picks up many more who
focus on media and entertainment.
Specific examples help to elucidate this effect. Table 1 shows the top 6 administrators by CC
and C-Score respectively for the 180 day period immediately following their promotion (success-
ful RfA). The CC-Score picks up three media-focused editors while the C-Score does not. These
editors focus on a specific media franchise (a TV show, for example), editing on this topic almost
exclusively. The long tail of edits for media-focused users often includes non-controversial articles
related to the same media franchise, for example articles on minor characters. This comprehensive
long tail means that the page-level clustering score for pages related to the media franchise is very
high, including the main pages related to the franchise; these main pages tend to be quite con-
troversial. This combination of controversy and clustering contributes significantly to the user’s
overall CC-Score, while the long tail of less controversial articles moderates the C-Score.
We note that all the users with very high C-Scores also have very high CC-Scores (falling at
least in the 96th and typically in the 99th percentile of CC-Score). However, the converse is not
true, because of the properties of the CC-Score described above. For example Admins 3, 4, and
5 in particular are relatively low in C-Score. Admin 5 is media-focused. Admin 4 has a high
CC-Score despite editing topically unrelated pages; yet the similarity scores between them are
high. This user focuses on disambiguation pages, all of which share common categories, and
many of which are maintained by the same users. Major disambiguation pages also turn out
to be fairly controversial, being of interest to editors contributing to any of the pages they link
to. This combination of a long tail of “related” disambiguation pages with controversial major
disambiguation pages leads to a high CC-Score, just as it did for media. As with media, the CC-
Score highlights a real phenomenon on Wikipedia: WikiProject Disambiguation, of which this user
is a member, consists of users who focus their efforts on disambiguation pages. Thus the CC-Score
9
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Figure 2: Human evaluation of the general category of edits (if any) for administrators directly
after their RfA. The 100 highest and 100 lowest scoring administrators for each metric are shown;
because of overlap, 286 administrators are represented in total. Many users with a high CC-Score
are topically focused, and the CC-Score finds many more media-focused users than the C-Score.
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is finding exactly single-topic editors of controversial pages, even if their topic is rather specific to
Wikipedia.
The story with Admin 3 is similar to Admins 4 and 5, in that this editor also edits a long tail of
uncontroversial articles. Qualitatively, it is useful that the CC-Score is picking up different people
than the simple C-Score, and sometimes turning up surprises – this is exactly the kind of behavior
one would want to pick up on, and it may give the CC-Score an advantage over the simple C-Score
in terms of detecting subtle manipulation.
We note that in this paper we are agnostic to what makes a page or a topic controversial, which
reveals much of interest about Wikipedia, but at the same time our methods are completely gen-
eral – specifically, we expect they would work well with any measure of controversy, and so the
techniques can easily be adapted to domain-specific needs. For example, to focus on more tradi-
tionally controversial single-topic editors, we might consider a modification of the page-level con-
troversy score which ignores controversy on media-related pages. More generally, the page-level
controversy score can give preference to any topic; it does not need to be related to controversy at
all. For example, we could find single-topic editors interested in a specific country.
4.3 Distribution of CC changes
While it is interesting to find editors focused on a single, controversial topic, it is not surprising
that such editors exist; Wikipedia certainly needs domain experts even on controversial topics.
Sudden changes in behavior, especially increases in the topical concentration or the controversial
nature of edits, are more surprising; especially so when some level of community trust is involved,
as with administrators. In particular, an editor changing behavior dramatically shortly after be-
coming an admin is suspicious.
The RfA process Standing for promotion to adminship on Wikipedia is an involved process.3
An editor who stands for, or is nominated for adminship must undergo a week of public scrutiny
which allows the community to build consensus about whether or not the candidate should be
promoted. A special page is set up on which the candidate makes a nomination statement about
why she or he should be promoted, based on detailed evidence from their history of contributions
to Wikipedia. Other users can then weigh in and comment on the case, and typically a large
volume of support (above 75% of commenters) as well as solid supporting statements from other
editors are necessary for high-level Wikipedia “bureaucrats” to approve the application. Burke
and Kraut provide many further details on this process [3]. Wikipedia policies call for nominees
to demonstrate a strong edit history, varied experience, adherence to Wikipedia policies on points
of view and consensus, as well as demonstration of willingness to help with tasks that admins
are expected to do, like building consensus. Burke and Kraut note that the actual value of some
of these may be mixed: participating in seemingly controversial tasks like fighting vandalism or
requesting admin intervention on a page before becoming an admin actually seems to hurt the
chances of success.
Overall, the Wikipedia community devotes significant effort to the RfA process, and there is
a lot of human attention focused on making sure that those who become admins are worthy of
the community’s trust. Now we turn to examining some cases where the behavior of an editor
changed significantly right after they became an admin.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Rfa
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Admin1
CC 100.0% Clust. 96.4% Cont. 99.9%
Title Edit% Cont.
Jehovah’s Witnesses 63.9% 100.0%
Salt 6.6% 99.7%
Tony Blair 1.6% 100.0%
Joseph Franklin Ruther-
ford
1.6% 99.7%
Robby Gordon 1.6% 96.4%
Leet 1.6% 100.0%
Jehovah’s Witnesses
and congregational
discipline
1.6% 99.5%
Wavelength (disam-
biguation)
1.6% 0.0%
Charles Taze Russell 1.6% 100.0%
Admin2
CC 99.9% Clust. 97.4% Cont. 95.7%
Title Edit% Cont.
Sailor Venus 4.2% 99.7%
Sailor Moon (character) 4.0% 99.9%
Sailor Mercury 3.7% 99.8%
List of minor Sailor
Moon characters
3.1% 99.7%
List of Sailor Moon
episodes
3.0% 99.8%
The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day
Saints
2.7% 100.0%
Sailor Starlights 2.7% 99.6%
Sailor Jupiter 2.6% 99.6%
Sailor Moon 2.6% 100.0%
Admin3
CC 99.9% Clust. 98.8% Cont. 76.6%
Title Edit% Cont.
Global city 2.8% 99.9%
List of school pranks 2.6% 99.7%
Scholars for 9/11 Truth 2.0% 99.9%
Pi 1.9% 100.0%
9/11 Truth movement 1.8% 100.0%
Christopher Langan 1.8% 99.9%
Hubbert peak theory 1.8% 100.0%
Stephen Barrett 1.6% 100.0%
Prime number 1.2% 99.9%
Admin4
CC 99.8% Clust. 99.9% Cont. 37.9%
Title Edit% Cont.
Matrix 5.4% 96.5%
Apartheid (disam-
biguation)
3.5% 99.8%
ETA (disambiguation) 3.5% 99.4%
Gemini 3.1% 92.8%
Solo 3.1% 59.0%
XXX 3.1% 96.8%
X Games 2.7% 96.9%
FAST 2.3% 39.2%
Fame 2.3% 74.7%
Admin5
CC 99.8% Clust. 99.3% Cont. 72.3%
Title Edit% Cont.
Meet Kevin Johnson 14.7% 98.8%
The Other Woman 10.1% 97.8%
Lost (season 4) 7.2% 99.6%
Lost (season 5) 6.8% 99.3%
List of Heroes episodes 6.2% 99.9%
Martin Keamy 5.3% 96.9%
The Shape of Things to
Come (Lost)
4.0% 98.3%
Through the Looking
Glass (Lost)
1.8% 99.6%
There’s No Place Like
Home
1.7% 98.0%
Admin6
CC 99.7% Clust. 95.1% Cont. 83.5%
Title Edit% Cont.
Big Brother 2007 (UK) 17.6% 100.0%
List of Big Brother 2007
housemates (UK)
6.7% 98.9%
Ionic bond 6.1% 98.4%
Big Brother (UK) 3.0% 99.9%
Big Brother 8 (U.S.) 2.4% 100.0%
Big Brother X 2.4% 38.8%
Big Brother 2006 (UK) 2.4% 100.0%
Big Brother (TV series) 2.4% 99.8%
Big Brother 2004 (UK) 2.4% 99.6%
Admin7
CC 100.0% Clust. 96.4% Cont. 99.9%
Title Edit% Cont.
Jehovah’s Witnesses 63.9% 100.0%
Salt 6.6% 99.7%
Tony Blair 1.6% 100.0%
Joseph Franklin Ruther-
ford
1.6% 99.7%
Robby Gordon 1.6% 96.4%
Leet 1.6% 100.0%
Jehovah’s Witnesses
and congregational
discipline
1.6% 99.5%
Wavelength (disam-
biguation)
1.6% 0.0%
Charles Taze Russell 1.6% 100.0%
Admin8
CC 99.6% Clust. 89.6% Cont. 99.8%
Title Edit% Cont.
Global warming 9.7% 100.0%
Global warming contro-
versy
5.6% 100.0%
Electronic voice phe-
nomenon
3.6% 100.0%
An Inconvenient Truth 3.3% 100.0%
Greenhouse effect 3.0% 100.0%
American Enterprise In-
stitute
2.9% 99.8%
The Great Global
Warming Swindle
2.8% 100.0%
List scientists opposing
the mainstream sci-
entific assessment of
global warming
2.8% 100.0%
The Beatles 2.6% 100.0%
Admin9
CC 99.5% Clust. 87.5% Cont. 99.8%
Title Edit% Cont.
1948 Palestinian exodus 6.8% 100.0%
Yasser Arafat 6.3% 100.0%
Israeli West Bank bar-
rier
4.9% 100.0%
Israeli settlement 4.9% 100.0%
Hebron 4.6% 100.0%
Second Intifada 3.2% 100.0%
Gaza Strip 3.2% 99.9%
Palestinian territories 2.9% 100.0%
Palestinian people 2.9% 100.0%
Admin10
CC 96.3% Clust. 52.1% Cont. 99.7%
Title Edit% Cont.
Rick Reilly 10.0% 99.6%
Keith Olbermann 6.4% 100.0%
Lara Logan 5.5% 99.9%
Treaty of Tripoli 4.5% 99.9%
Glenn Greenwald 3.6% 99.9%
Eli Whitney, Jr. 3.6% 99.3%
Michael J. Fox 3.6% 99.8%
Newton’s laws of mo-
tion
3.6% 99.9%
William Connolley 2.7% 100.0%
Admin11
CC 96.9% Clust. 59.6% Cont. 99.6%
Title Edit% Cont.
Abortion 36.6% 100.0%
University of Michigan 5.5% 99.9%
Jesus 3.4% 100.0%
Islamofascism 2.8% 100.0%
NARAL Pro-Choice
America
2.8% 99.0%
Intelligent design 2.8% 100.0%
Saint Joseph 2.1% 99.9%
C. S. Lewis 2.1% 100.0%
God 1.4% 100.0%
Admin12
CC 97.7% Clust. 69.3% Cont. 99.6%
Title Edit% Cont.
Yasser Arafat 5.2% 100.0%
Estimates of the Pales-
tinian Refugee flight of
1948
2.7% 99.6%
Israel 2.2% 100.0%
ArabIsraeli conflict 2.0% 100.0%
Ariel Sharon 1.8% 100.0%
Jews 1.8% 100.0%
Antisemitism 1.5% 100.0%
Muhammad al-Durrah
incident
1.5% 100.0%
Second Intifada 1.5% 100.0%
Table 1: The most edited articles by the administrators with the highest CC-Scores (top 6) and high-
est C-Scores (bottom 6) during the 180 days after they became an admin. Each article is annotated
with the percentile of its article-level controversy score and the percentage of the administrator’s
edits which were to that article. On top of each table are the percentiles for the CC, Clustering,
and C-Scores of the administrator during the same period.
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Admin 1: Rank 1
Before RfA After RfA
Article Edit%
Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses
48.5%
Eschatology of Je-
hovah’s Witnesses
3.8%
Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses practices
2.1%
Organizational
structure of Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses
1.6%
Criticism of Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses
1.5%
History of Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses
1.4%
Christianity 1.3%
Controversies re-
garding Jehovah’s
Witnesses
1.1%
Beliefs and prac-
tices of Jehovah’s
Witnesses
0.8%
Article Edit%
Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses
62.1%
Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses and the
United Nations
6.8%
Criticism of Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses
4.9%
Salt 3.9%
Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses and congre-
gational discipline
2.9%
Eschatology of Je-
hovah’s Witnesses
1.9%
Blue link 1.0%
Brendan Loy 1.0%
Charles Taze Rus-
sell
1.0%
Admin 2: Rank 3
Before RfA After RfA
Article Edit%
Chiropractic 6.5%
Extreme physical
information
3.6%
Prime number 3.4%
Normal number 3.2%
Axiom of choice 3.1%
Year 10,000 prob-
lem
2.2%
Difference operator 2.0%
Kenny Rogers
Roasters
1.7%
Selector calculus 1.7%
Article Edit%
Global city 3.9%
Christopher Lan-
gan
2.3%
Stephen Barrett 2.0%
Scholars for 9/11
Truth
1.9%
List of school
pranks
1.8%
The National Coun-
cil Against Health
Fraud
1.7%
9/11 Truth move-
ment
1.6%
Quackwatch 1.6%
Pi 1.5%
Admin 3: Rank 5
Before RfA After RfA
Article Edit%
Rechargeable bat-
tery
8.0%
Flywheel energy
storage
6.5%
Ethanol fuel 3.0%
Imaginary color 3.0%
Mensural notation 2.7%
Noise pollution 2.5%
Pay it forward 2.1%
TamilNet 1.8%
CIE 1931 color
space
1.6%
Article Edit%
Buddhahood 13.2%
Sri Lanka and state
terrorism
3.9%
Premier of the Re-
public of China
3.0%
Sri Lankan Tamil
militant groups
2.8%
Outpost for Hope 2.6%
Sri Lanka Armed
Forces
2.6%
Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam
2.1%
Esperanto 1.4%
List of attacks at-
tributed to the LTTE
1.4%
Admin 4: Rank 9
Before RfA After RfA
Article Edit%
Biman Bangladesh
Airlines
8.4%
Fatimah 6.3%
First Solution
Money Transfer
3.0%
72 Virgins 1.8%
2007 Bangladesh
cartoon controversy
1.3%
Ramadan 1.2%
Royal Bengal Air-
line
1.2%
Criticism of the
Qur’an
1.2%
Air Sylhet 1.1%
Article Edit%
Mawlid 20.0%
Fatimah 11.8%
Five Pillars of Islam 3.6%
Air Sylhet 3.0%
Ezra 2.5%
Hajj 2.1%
Osmani Interna-
tional Airport
2.0%
Biman Bangladesh
Airlines
1.8%
Eid ul-Fitr 1.8%
Table 2: Most edited articles for 180 days before and after becoming an administrator. Users were
selected from the top ten CC-Score changes.
Changes in behavior Table 2 shows the article edit history of four administrators for 180 days
before and 180 days after their successful RfA. These users were among the top 10 administrators
ranked by the change in CC-Score between the two periods (Admins 1, 2, 3, and 4 were ranked 1,
3, 5, and 9 respectively in CC-Score change). For two of the administrators shown (Admin 1 and
Admin 4), the change in CC-Score is explained by a change in edit distribution; while the general
category of their edits remains consistent, they concentrated on this category much more heavily
after their respective RfAs.
For Admins 2 and 3 in Table 2, the change in CC Score is the result of a rather dramatic shift in
topic. Admin 2 shifts from mathematics to 9/11 conspiracy theories (several related pages are not
shown in the table), while Admin 3 shifts from relatively unfocused edits to the Sri Lankan Civil
War. Upon further examination of their behavior, neither administrator appears to be violating
Wikipedia policy (instead acting as mediators and enforcing a neutral point of view), and yet the
changes are quite striking. While it may not be the case for these editors, a similar pattern could
reflect subtle manipulation by one-sided enforcement of the NPOV guidelines, for example.
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Figure 3: Distribution of changes in the CC-Score before and after successful and unsuccessful
RfAs, and for users who have never participated in an RfA.
Population-level changes This leads us to a more general question. Is there evidence of a
population-wide change in Admin behavior after successful RfAs? Figure 3 shows the distri-
bution of CC-Score changes for RfA candidates, both successful and unsuccessful, before and
after their respective RfAs (again 180 days each), and for a group of 1000 active editors who were
never nominated for administrator status. The results clearly show that those who stand for pro-
motion and are successful behave differently at the population-level than those who either stand
for promotion and fail or those who never stand for promotion at all. In fact, they end up stay-
ing closer to their previous behavior than either of the other groups – the variance in CC-Score
changes is higher for the other two groups than it is for editors who had successful RfAs (see
below for details on the data and statistical tests). This implies strongly that there is no serious
problem with people becoming admins on Wikipedia in order to push their own point of view.
There are two reasonable hypotheses that may explain the lower variance in CC-Score changes for
successful RfA candidates. Either some aspect of the RfA process selects for editors who are less
likely to change their behavior, or the very fact of becoming an administrator has a “centralizing”
influence: given their new status, associated with a (real or perceived) higher level of scrutiny,
administrators become less likely to change their behavior.
The hypothesis that the RfA process selects for editors who tend not to change their CC-Scores
is unlikely, as we would then expect this type of user to appear in the population of users who were
never nominated to become administrators. If this were the case, then the non-RfA distribution
would be a mix of the successful and unsuccessful RfA distributions; instead, the unsuccessful
and non-RfA distributions are similar to each other and different from successful RfAs. We run a
second test that provides further evidence for the centralizing hypothesis. We construct a matched
sample of successful and unsuccessful RfA candidates, matching on the estimated probability pi that
editor i’s RfA will be successful RfA based on i’s pre-RfA behavior. We use the model of Burke
and Kraut to estimate the pis [3]. For each successful RfA j, we find the editor in the unsuccessful
RfA set k with pk closest to pj (throwing out examples that are not within 1 percentage point). We
then compare the population-level behavior of the two sets of editors we are left with. Now that
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we have controlled for endogenous factors, we expect that the two populations are very similar
in intrinsic qualities: the only difference between them should be that the successful ones actually
became admins and the unsuccessful ones did not. We again find that the population of successful
admins is significantly different, exhibiting more stable behavior than the population of editors
who were unsuccessful in their RfAs (see below for details on statistics). This suggests that some
aspect of actually being an administrator reduces the propensity for significant behavior changes
(incidentally, this makes administrators who do significantly change their editing behavior all the
more interesting).
Data and statistics: For the non-RfA users, we use edits before and after a randomly selected
edit. The distributions of changes for unsuccessful and non-RfA editors have a significantly higher
variance than the distribution for successful RfAs, with the 95% confidence interval on the ratio
of the variance of the successful RfA distribution to the variance among non-RfA users being
[0.22, 0.28]. The 95% confidence interval on the same ratio for unsuccessful and non-RfA users,
on the other hand, is [0.88, 1.11] (est. 0.99). Further, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test rules out an
identical distribution for successful and unsuccessful distributions (p = 10−7, D = 0.109), and
between the successful and non-RfA distributions (p = 10−4, D = 0.086). We cannot rule out the
possibility that the non-RfA and unsuccessful distributions are identical (p = 0.25, D = 0.042).
Closer examination of the tails of the distributions does not show any differences not already
explained by the variance. For the matched sample described above, the 95% confidence interval
for the ratio of the variances of successful and unsuccessful RfA distributions is [0.32, 0.43]; the
conclusions of the KS-tests are unchanged.
5 Discussion
This paper contributes to the literature in two different ways: first, we introduce new behavioral
metrics for quantifying controversial editing on Wikipedia. The measures we introduce can be
used (perhaps with domain specific modifications) to triage suspicious behavior for deeper inves-
tigation. Second, these measures allow us to contribute to the study of Wikipedia as an evolving
social system: along with showing that Wikipedia admins behave in a stable manner, we also
identify some intuitively surprising topics of conflict in Wikipedia.
The Controversy Score (C-Score), measures the extent to which an editor is influencing con-
troversial pages. The Clustered Controversy Score (CC-Score) builds on the C-Score, finding
single-topic editors of controversial pages. Both metrics are flexible, since they are language- and
platform- independent, and can work with different measures of controversy.
We validate the C- and CC-Scores as user-level measures of controversy on a set of blocked
users. On a set of administrators, we find several weaknesses of the C-Score: it misses contro-
versial, single-topic editors in the presence of a long tail of related, but less controversial, pages.
Further, the C-Score gives undue weight to unfocused vandalism fighting, a common behavior
among administrators. The CC-Score solves many of these issues, allowing us to find controver-
sial, single-topic editors, and often finds editors who would not show up ranked highly on just the
C-Score measure. The CC-score also enables us to identify interesting Wikipedia-specific phenom-
ena, for example, the substantial levels of controversy associated with some media/entertainment
specific pages as well as with some disambiguation pages.
We also show how the CC-Score can be used to analyze behavior changes, both for single ed-
itors and in aggregate. We find several instances of dramatic shifts in behavior by administrators
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upon assuming their responsibilities. At the same time, we show that administrators as a group
change their behavior significantly less than any other group of Wikipedians. This consistency
appears to be due to the role of administrator itself, rather than being a selection effect.
Future work While we focus on editors working alone in this paper, an extension of the CC-
Score might highlight groups of editors influencing a single, controversial topic; this presents in-
teresting computational and evaluation challenges. Improvements to the CC-Score to better detect
manipulation might focus on natural language processing, or on non-local aspects of an editor’s
behavior. Being platform-independent, the CC-Score is a useful tool for analyzing behavior in
general collective wisdom processes; we are interested in applications of the CC-Score to other
domains.
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